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To the Members of the Conference:
This Chairman's letter is our joint effort,
as the outgoing and incoming Chairmen of
the Conference. It reflects the ~eality that
the Conference is constantly undergoing
change, transition and challenge.
In the 1983-1984 year, both William
Morris and Len Young Smith retired after
long and productive service to the Conference. During this year, we have honored
Joe E. Covington on his retirement as the
Conference's Director of Testing, and we
have welcomed Joseph R. Julin as the new
Director of Testing, Research and Development. The office of the Director has
moved from Columbia, Missouri to Gainesville, Florida.
The Conference is in the process of conducting a self-study. (If you have not responded to the Chairman's letter in the
May 1985 issue of The Bar Examiner, please
do so.) The Conference and all Boards of
Bar Examiners are considering the impact
of Hoover v. Ronwin and Piper v. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire. Character and fit2 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

ness programs are being evaluated. In California, and various other states, new testing programs and new procedures are
being designed to assure the competence of
applicants to the Bar.
This summer marks a number of other
transitions for the Conference. First, John
Germany has retired as Chairman of the
Multistate Bar Examination Committee.
John, a former Chairman of the Conference, has served the Conference and the
Multistate Bar Examination with unflagging dedication . In his work with Joe Covington and the members of the MBE Committee, John has played a key role in
moving the MBE program forward; in
improving the quality of the MBE and
assuring its validity and reliability; and in
addressing the complex and demanding
problems that the Conference and the
jurisdictions continually face. John's commitment has set a high standard of responsibility to our profession. We take this opportunity to thank John for many tasks
well done and his exemplary leadership.
Stuart Lampe, who has served the Con-

ference so ably as its Secretary for many
years, th is year asked not to be renominated for that position. If the Board of
Managers has an " institutional memory,"
then Stuart has been it. The Board will
miss Stuart, and his successors will have a
very lofty standard to meet.
Another transition comes with Wayne
Denton's election to the Board of Managers ex officio as the Chairman of the Conference's Committee of Bar Admission Administrators . Wayne succeeds the indefatigable
Marlyce Gholston in that position . The
Conference can never sufficiently acknowledge the contributions to the admissions process by people such as Marlyce
and Wayne and the Administrators whom
they represent.
In addition to Wayne Denton, the Conference welcomes three new members of
the Board: Beverly Tarpley of Texas, Marvin Barkin of Florida and Stuart Duhl of
Illinois . The Board continues to draw its
members from the ranks of people who
are, or have been, bar examiners around
the country. The Conference will offer
them opportunities for service, ~nteresting
occupation and association with a fine
group of women and men dedicated to
maintaining the highest standards so that
people can continue, in Holmes' words," to
live greatly in the law."
Sincerely,

~~,
Robert J. Muldoon, Jr.
Chairman

Sumner T. Bernstein
Immediate Past Chairman
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This essay is a slightly reworked version of the introduction lo the author's book American Legal Ethics
(1985). Copyright 1985 by Mallhew Bender & Co. ,
Inc. ; reprinted with permission. Portions of this essay
originally appeared as an article in The University
of Baltimore Law Forum, Fall, 1983 , p. 6, and
are used here with the permission of that journal.

Getting Serious About Legal Ethics
by Thomas L. Shaffer

here seems to be a difference between saying to a naughty child, "A
good girl does not turn the garden hose on
her grandmother," and, "If you turn the
garden hose on your grandmother, you're
going to be in trouble."
American legal ethics deserves to call
itself ethics to the extent that it focuses on
the first kind of statement. Ethics is not a
matter of staying out of trouble. It is a
matter of being good. The ultimate ethical
question for American lawyers is whether
it is possible, in America, to be a lawyer and
a good person-and, if so, how. Law is relevant to this question, but it will never be
enough; and it will not be relevant in the
same way that law is relevant to the study
of contracts or of federal income taxation.
This approach to legal ethics-to see
legal ethics as ethics- will preserve or revive in the university and in the profession
an ancient discipline: the study of morals as
that subject has been of interest in philosophy, theology, literature, and history. It
aims to locate and clean up and weigh the
roots of behavior and of admonition.
4 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

This is a far more personal venture than
study of codes of professional ethicswhich are not ethics, but administrative
regulation. A person accounts for himself
and examines himself when she or he studies morals. This personal (or, as ethics
scholars sometimes call it, pre-rational)
concern is a necessary part of the agenda in
ethics.1 Legal ethics should study morals in
this personally relevant way, but it should
try in addition to study morals (to use
Thomas More's phrase) " in the tangle of
the mind."2 That is, with the discipline and
rigor and civility that we American lawyers
observe when we talk about the rule against
perpetuities or the First Amendment. There
is no inconsistency between habits of compassion and habits of rigor; the best people
in our profession have always had both.
If lawyers really studied ethics they
would also study their culture. Those who
have preserved the study of ethics in the
West have been at home in every corner of
our civilization, among Greek philosophers, among biblical Hebrews, in the
church. Legal ethics should be comfortable

with thinkers from Augustine to Maimonides, Aquinas to Karl Barth, John Calvin
and Martin Luther to the Niebuhrs and
Martin Buber-all of these as well as the
great American teachers of legal ethics,
David Hoffman, George Sharswood,
Thomas Goode Jones, Henry Drinker, and
all the rest.3
In these two ways (the personal and the
cultural) legal ethics is in part a consideration of Plato's Republic-of the conversation
between Socrates and Thrasymachus, in
which Socrates decided that the two of
them would discover justice in the way
they treated one another.4 And it is in part
a consideration of everything that went
into making each of us who she or he is,
and that went into making our communities what they are.
I got a lasting lesson in legal ethics in the
faculty lounge one day, when I came upon a
colleague who was reading the latest issue
of Sports Illustrated. "You know," he said,
"they give Earl Campbell the highest praise
you can give a Texan." (My colleague is a
Texan.)
"Oh," I said. "What is that?"
"They say he had a good mama ."
Earl Campbell's mother is personal to
him, of course, but my colleague claimed
also a cultural importance, for all Texans,
in the fact that this prominent Texan has a
good mother. The ethical lesson was personal and cultural: I doubt that our legal
ethics will be real for us, personally or culturally, if we leave our mothers out of it,
even if including our mothers reduces the
time we have available for codes and cases.
Because each of us values good mothers in
all of our lives, we are able to find value in
Socrates' dialogue about justice. He says to
Thrasymachus: (I) We are going to figure
out, as thinking people, what justice is. (2)
We are going to begin with the discoverya discovery I just noticed, or rememberedthat justice is a virtue;s justice is something
people give to one another. (3) And therefore, as we proceed, let's try to notice and
learn from one another what justice isfrom the way we treat one another. Justice
is a moral subject, and an interesting subject, and is therefore an ethical subject; eth-

Thomas L. Shaffer, 8.A., ].D., LL.D.; member of the
Indiana Bar. Professor of Law, Washing/on and Lee
University.

ics can be defined as the discussion of (a)
what is interesting (b) in morals. Justice as
ethics-that is, as a virtue-has an agenda
that is personal and an agenda that is
culturaJ.6
Socrates had learned somewhere (maybe
from his parents) (probably from his parents) that a good person treats other persons as creatures like himself. In a discursive, virtually academic setting, he put the
label "justice" on what he already knew.
That procedure will also be important in
modern professional discourse, where lawyers, old and young, learn how to treat
their clients. A human person, especially
one up close, is what Justice James Wilson
called the noblest work of God; much more
important, he said, than the government.7
It is wrong to use a person as the occasion
of another person's profit or learning or
entertainment. This point has personal
significance; it has professional significance-it was the turning point in the
Legal Ethics I 5

Socrates-Thrasymachus conversationand it has cultural significance: Socrates
did not call his discovery good manners; he
called it justice.
Both stories-the one about Mr. Campbell's mother and Socrates's discovery that
a conversation about justice shows what
justice is-are interesting and they are
about morals. Those facts make them ethical. Ethics is the consideration of what is
interesting in morals.

Vicarious Morals. Universities and professions deal with interesting subjects by
cutting them up into little pieces; legal
ethics is only a piece of ethics . Our subject
involves what a lawyer should do as a lawyer; that is a specific jurisdiction, but we will
do well not to let it get narrow on us. It can
be claimed-it has, often, been claimed by
American lawyers-that being a lawyer is a
way to become a good person.a Most of us
lawyers think, at least, that being a lawyer
is compatible with being a good person. We
hope that the lawyer part of us does not
destroy goodness. It is still possible, in living
as a lawyer, to ask ourselves broad moral
questions-such as:
-What am I up to in my client's life?
-How is my client changing because of
me?
-How am I changing because of himbecause of what I think he wants me to
do?
Those are broad questions. They are also
vicarious . That latter fact narrows inquiry,
but, maybe, those questions are more interesting because they are vicarious. For example, if I ask you whether I should lie to the
judge, you will likely tell me that I should
not. If I ask you if I should endeavor to help
the poor and the ignorant, you will likely
tell me that I should. Professional ethics
takes its special jurisdiction, not from those
questions, but from the fact that professional life includes being of assistance to
people who have good reasons for lying to
judges and spurning the poor.
Professor Harry W. Jones said in a lecture at Villanova,9 "One of the best men I
have ever known, my Sunday School
6 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

teacher .. . was ... a vastly successful practicing lawyer and a person of stiffly uncompromising rectitude .... How could he
have accommodated his keen sense of justice to the partisan ethics of the profession
he thought of as his life's vocation?" Professor Jones found it interesting to ask
whether his teacher would have helped a
person who had been indicted for a violent
crime; whether the teacher would be willing to conceal incriminating evidence, or to
cast guilt on an innocent person. Such
questions became interesting because they
involved a client. They would have been
less interesting if they had involved concealment or false accusation by the Sundayschool teacher in his own behalf. If that had
been the case, Professor Jones would have
gone to a different class, or maybe to a
different church.
This vicarious focus gives legal ethics
two kinds of tension: (a) between a lawyer's morals and the morals of his client,
and (b) between a lawyer's morals and his
sense of public and professional duty. Those
tensions are topical in legal ethics. We who
work together in the law are aware of
these two tensions; we feel them. These
two tensions are evident also in the history
of American legal ethics. Chief Justice
Roger Brooke Taney was attorney general
of Maryland before he became a judge. As a
lawyer he argued a case involving importers in interstate commerce. As a judge,
years later, he decided the same question.
When he was an advocate, he argued for a
result that favored Maryland; when he was
a judge he decided the other way. The
inconsistency was, to his 19th-century gentleman's conscience, a bother-a moral
bother. He felt he had to explain himself. "I
argued the case .. . and ... at that time persuaded myself that I was right .... But
further and more mature reflection convinced me that the rule [finally] laid down
by the Supreme Court is a just and safe
one," he said. "The question was a very
difficult one."10 Why difficult? Why is the
inconsistent behavior even noticed? Be ca use Taney
felt so tender about not following as judge
a position he had urged as a legal rule when
he was employed to be an advocate for a

was a man of principle. He gained renown
as a modern American lawyer-hero when
Robert Bolt's play "A Man for All Seasons"
became popular in this country in the
1960s. 13 More did not go to his death saying that martyrdom is a gentleman's lot; he
died announcing three principles: the legal
principle that silence is not treason, the
moral principle that one should not take an
oath falsely, and the religious principle that
the King of England could not exercise
ultimate spiritual authority. He also went
to his death with significant self-deception
about what was going on in England. Part
of his self-deception was the notion that
principles were an adequate way to describe his moral life.
David Hoffman's Resolutions are almost
moral principles (he was fond of maxims),
and so are the greater parts of the earliest
codes of legal ethics, such as Judge Jones's
1887 Alabama Code, and the 1908 American Bar Association Canons. They all contain deceptions analogous to Thomas
More's.
The claim that American legal ethics
rests on principles suggests an ancient contrast between virtues and principles as
being fundamentally significant in morals,
a contrast between being good and being
right, a contrast between Aristotle, who did
not announce principles, and most of modern philosophical ethics and jurisprudence,
which rarely announces anything else. The
difference is between accounting for morals with the Seoul Handbook, which talks
about qualities, or dispositions, or habits
such as bravery, cheerfulness, honesty, and
loyalty, instead of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which is a set of principles.14
This difference is subtle at first, but it is
real and it is important. When you get
going on it, you are doing nothing less than
invoking Earl Campbell's mother in legal
ethics . You are discovering the fact that
there is in our lives moral ma t erial that is
deeper and more explanatory than principles: Maybe we come to see something as a
moral problem because of this deeper material. The most interesting moments in
e thics deal not with right versus wrong,
but with right versus right; n ot w ith which
8 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

moral rules you follow, but with how you
live with all the moral rules you are supposed to follow. Aristotle understood that;
so did Atticus Finch.
The legal ethics of the two kingdomsl s say that
it is possible to be a good person and an
American lawyer and that the way to do it
is to separate one's personal morals from
one's professional morals. This point of
view says that it is possible to be a good
lawyer and a good person too, but rarely the
twain shall meet. The purest doctrinal
expression of the two kingdoms in American legal ethics is the development of the
adversary ethic in the late nineteenth century.16 The adversary ethic says that it is
selfish and immoral to refuse to do for
clients what clients want done . Modern
lawyer-heroes ofte n a nnounce this point
of view (for example G eorge V. Higgins's
Boston criminal defense lawyer Jerry Kennedy1 7), but the moral argument has ancient roots. My way of naming it is borrowed from Martin Luther; much of his
thinking on the point came from St. Augustine-and from the Ne w Testament. The re

are personal tensions here, too: It is difficult for many of us to figure out a way to
live bifurcated moral lives, and it is almost
always unsatisfactory to answer that bifurcation is what the legal system requires
of us.
Professional legal ethics finds moral authority in the profession itself. Judge (Dean)
Sharswood's 1854 essay on legal ethics
invoked the morals of the fraternity.is
Sharswood, who was a magnificently clubbable man, told his students that they would
not go wrong if they sought in everything
the approval of their professional elders.
This point of view is prominent in the
modern lawyer stories of Louis Auchincloss and James Gould Cozzens. The notion that the profession had or could have
moral authority led to the founding of the
first American bar associations in the
1870s, but the notion has ancient roots.
The earliest hero stories in the West are
stories of warriors and adventurers who
did what they were given to do, and who
learned from their colleagues how to do
what they were given to do. This point of
view preserves the tensions of modern
professional life: Law students are familiar
with the morality that calls on them to
imitate their elders, but they are also familiar with Watergate, security frauds, and
murky characters who hand around police
courts and hospital emergency rooms looking for legal business.

The legal ethics of dissent. Rebellion is a
persistent strain in the American legal profession; the American Revolution was,
uniquely, a lawyer's revolution, as all of our
subsequent national revolutions have been.
Rebellion is noticeable in the "vulgar bar"
of urban stories, in the frontier profession
in America, and among modern lawyers
who find unbearable elitism in bar associations and among gentlemen. Ephraim Tutt,
lawyer-hero of more than a hundred short
stories in the old Saturday Evening Post, is a
20th-century example of this point of view,
as are Higgins's Jerry Kennedy and the
wonderful, real-life Fanny Hotlzmann.19
These lawyers seem to believe, and sometimes say, that the way to be a good person

and a lawyer is to ignore what prosperous,
elder lawyers say to do. In a more positive
analysis, the morals of those who dissent
are likely to be more personal and cultural
than professional. They refuse to make a
morality out of procedures such as the
adversary ethic. They make the useful
point that a client is a person before he is a
moral problem. Some of them see the law
as a means to social change. These last talk,
as the civil-liberties lawyer Charles Morgan does,20 not of law and order, but of law
against order.

•

•

•

How does one talk in the profession
about such moral point of view? The howdo-we-talk question, to Socrates, was substantive; the answer to it contains the
answer to what justice is . The most common method for talking about moral questions in law school, and especially in the
study of professional responsibility, has
been to talk in quandaries. Our penchant
for the study of cases in law carries over
into a preference for cases in morals, and so
we present a dilemma and say, "What
would you do?" This method is attractive,
unavoidable, and limited.
For one thing, the case method in morals
overlooks the fact that a quandary becomes a
quandary because of morals. Morals may
solve quandaries but, before that, they create quandaries. Jean-Paul Sartre presents
the case of the World War II French patriot
who is the sole support of his mother:
Should he leave home and join the Free
French Army, or stay at home and care for
his mother? There would be no quandary if
the man in the story had not learned, somewhere, to love his country-and not only
his country but a particular view of what
his country is. There would be no quandary if he had not learned, somewhere, to
love his mother, and not only to love her,
but to express his love in a particular way.
Sartre uses the story to make the existentialist claim that our morals are the product
of our choices; they are morals only because we choose to make them so. I think
he came up with a good quandary, but, in
Legal Ethics I 9

figuring it out, he ignored culture; he did
not take account in a truthful way of Earl
Campbell's mother. The mother in the Sartre example is not a mystery and a source
of value, as real mothers are; she is only a
difficulty. Sartre might have done better if
he had been a Texan.
The maternalistic lawyer who has as a
client a teenager in trouble in juvenile
court may be in a quandary when she compares doing for her client what her client
wants done: She wants her client to grow
up. Her client wants to be restored to his
colleagues in the alley. The state boys'
school would dry him out and teach him a
trade, but he is not anxious to be enrolled
there. Procedural notions point in one
direction; the wisdom-such as it is-of a
culture that imposes values on children, as
any culture inevitably does, points in another direction. But the quandary will not
be there if mama-knows-best lawyer morality is strong enough to overcome her law
school acculturation to free choice and due
process. (Atticus Finch, was a remarkably
paternalistic lawyer, but Atticus never went
to law school.) The quandary would not be
there if moral, not legal, notions of civil
liberty were strong and the determination
to protect the weak were not as strong as
our American-lawyer-gentleman stories
make it . One who discusses morals in the
context of a quandary needs to know what
he is doing, and what he is not doing.
For another thing, quandary ethics has
Sartre's existentialist bias. It tends to equate
one's morals with one's taste in beer. It
tends to make a fetish (rather than a
virtue) 21 of tolerance and to avoid intellectual rigor. In a characteristic display of this,
one of us presents the case of the maternalistic lawyer and the teenager, and then
directs argument over it for a while, and
then moves on to the next quandary. We do
not evaluate the moral arguments we make
to one another. It is not true that every
point of view in ethics is as valuable as
every other point of view. A good deal of
moral argument is fatuous, and can be
shown to be fatuous. Part of our professional calling is to think about our professional morals . If the topic of discussion
10 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

were covenants-running-with-the-land,
we would see that in a moment. The First
Resolution in Spencer's Case, that a tenant's
covenant to build a bridge cannot benefit a
successor owner of the land, is a silly rule,
and the discussion in property class will not
go on long before someone notices and
describes the silliness. The general attitude
among property teachers is that such judgment and analysis must occur or students
will not learn to think like lawyers. Quandary ethics is weak because it does not call
upon the intellectural rigor we demand in
our property courses.
For some reason, possibly because values
are often religious and Americans have the
anti-intellectural notion that it is not civil
to talk about religion, we have not analyzed and debated moral notions with the
openness and discipline we bring to legal
notions . Quandaries keep us in the intellectual shallows; they make it comfortable
for us to go on a little hike through a field
of moral brambles and then come home
thinking we have learned something .
Finally, quandaries hide people, as Sartre's example hid the mother of the French
patriot. Quandaries are abstract. It is probably the case that no one would retain his
clarity on the answer to a moral quandary,
such as Sartre's example or the juvenile
court case, after he gets to know the people
involved. For this reason, I find it useful to
read and think and talk about stories. Stories display morals more than announce
them. They involve quandary and princi-

pies, but they put quandary in a narrative,
human context; and they show that principles are something we live with more than
live by. The context cuts the quandary and
the principle down to size. A story helps
give the quandary and the principle appropriate amounts of weight, that is, the
weight they have in life. Stories are in fact
the way we know what to do about the pain
and the tragedy of those who come into
our professional lives.
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Readmission and Reinstatement, a Role
for Bar Examiners: A Florida Experience
by Stanley A . Spring

M ode! Rules fo r Lawyer D iscipline and Disability Proceedings (Model
Rules) have been developed by the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional D iscipline to assist jurisdictions in implementation of Lawyer Sta ndards and are published in Professional Discipline fo r Lawyers and
Judges, a publication of the National Center
for Professional Res ponsibility of the ABA.
The Model Rules and all jurisdictions
regard disbarmen t as the most severe of all
lawyer disciplines. The sanction of disbarment results in removal of the license to
practice law. A substantial period of t ime,
usually three to five years, is required by
most jurisdictions before application for
readmission is even permitted. As indication of the finality of disbarment is the use
of the term readmission in the Model Rules
and most jurisdictions w hen identifying
the process and procedures required of the
disbarred lawyer to again secure a license
and resume practice of the law.
Reinstatement is used in the Model Ru les
and most jurisdictions to identify the process and procedures requir ed of the lawyer
12 / T he Bar Examiner I A ugus t 1985

after the sanction of suspension, disability,
resignation in some cases, and in other
situations where fitnes s to resu me pract ice
must be shown after a period of interrupted practice not involving disbarment.
The Model Rules, as w ell as Florida rules,
provide that a judgment of disabarment, as
well as resignation, terminates a person's
status as a lawyer by removal of the license
to practice law. In resignation, as well as
disbarment, readmission is and shou ld be
used rather than reinstatement w h en describing those procedures required to again
secure a license to practice law.
Suspension, by definition, connotes temporary disqualification, and reinstatement is
used when describing the procedu res necessary in removing temporary disqualificat ion to pract ice where neither the license
nor the court's jurisdiction over the lawyer
has been removed or terminated during
the period of suspension .

Readmission
The Model Rules recommend t h at after
disbarment, the lawyer ought no t be able

to apply for readmission until at least five
years after the effective date of disbarment
and all petitions for readmission should be
filed with and considered by the disciplinary agency. The disciplinary agency has
no independent mission or original jurisdiction in determining fitness for admission and licensure to practice law.
In contrast, procedures contained and
provided for in The Florida Bar Integration
Rule, Article XI and its Bylaws, (Rules of
The Supreme Court of Florida regulating
lawyers admitted to practice in Florida),
provide that no application for readmission
may be tendered within three years after
the date of disbarment, or such longer
period as the court might determine in the
disbarment order. Further, and significantly
different than the Model Rules, a disbarred
Florida lawyer may be readmitted only
upon full compliance with the rules and
regulations set forth for those governing
admission to the Florida Bar. Effective
since December 1, 1972, this rule regulating lawyers in Florida requires a disbarred
lawyer to make application for readmission
to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners,
rather than the disciplinary agency, as
recommended in the Model Rules and as
followed in most jurisdictions.
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners
have established and developed over the
years successful and tested procedures to
determine the character, fitness, and general qualifications of persons applying for a
license to practice law. These procedures
include the successful taking of the Florida
Bar Examination to insure competency in
the law. A disbarred Florida lawyer to again
resume practice of the law must, as any
other applicant, satisfy the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners of these same qualifications
including the successful retaking of the
Florida Bar Examination.
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners has
by its very mission developed the necessary expertise to satisfy itself that each
applicant recommended to the court for
licensure is not only of good character but
also has adequate knowledge of the law,
including the Code of Professional Responsibility, the standards and ideals of the pro-

Stanley A. Spring, a member of the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee, is retired as Staff Counsel and
Director of the Legal Division of the Florida Bar. He was
responsible for lawyer discipline and regulation, ethics,
and the unauthorized practice of law. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and not of any
organization with which he is or has been affiliated.

fession, and is in all ways a fit person to
take the oath and perform the obligations
and responsibilities of an attorney.
It is not unusual for the Supreme Court
of Florida in disbarment orders to impose
periods ranging from four to twenty years,
rather than the minimum three years,
after which the disbarred lawyer may then
make application for readmission.
Presently pending before the Supreme
Court of Florida is a proposed rule change
submitted by the Board of Governors of the
Florida Bar providing that no application
for readmission may be tendered within
five years after the date of disbarment or
such longer period as the court may order.
Raising the minimum period before readmission after disbarment to five years,
Florida would then conform to the time
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standard set forth in the Model Rules for
readmission application after disbarment.
In the many meetings of the Florida Bar
Board of Governors and its committees
over the past several years during which
changes to the rules regulating the Florida
Bar were considered, no suggestion was received from any source that consideration
be given to returning readmission procedures after disbarment from the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners to the disciplinary
agency. To the contrary, the Florida Board
of Bar Examiners, who as a separate arm of
the Supreme Court of Florida are independent of any disciplinary agency, have discharged their assigned responsibilities in readmission after disbarment so satisfactorily
that the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and other jurisdictions
would be well served to give serious consideration to adopting a rule similar to Florida
having the bar admission agency, rather
than the disciplinary agency, determining
fitness for readmission after disbarment.
Florida rules, along with the majority of
jurisdictions and the Model Rules, do not
authorize permanent disbarment. However, Florida rules do provide for a lawyer
to resign with disciplinary proceedings
pending, and if the petition to resign states
that it is without leave to apply for readmission permanently, such condition precludes any readmission . All other petitions
for readmission after resignation with discipline pending may be filed within three
years or such additional time as may be
stated in the petition to resign and as
reflected in the court order.accepting and
approving the resignation.
The Supreme Court of Florida has not
hestitated to bind resigned members to
their petition of permanent resignation,
the court distinguishing that a judgment of
disbarment does not authorize permanent
disbarment in the sense that a disbarred
lawyer may never petition for readmission.
In effect, permanent disbarment does live
in Florida but in a different form . Notwithstanding that a permanent resignation has
the same effect and goes beyond the disbarment rules, the readmission procedures
after resignation with discipline pending
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have not been assigned to the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners as in disbarment.
Rather, readmission after resignation with
discipline pending, which as in disbarment
requires a minimum of three years before
readmission, has remained within and the
responsibility of the disciplinary agency to
determine those qualifications that are the
business of the bar examiners.
The Model Rules, in dealing with resignation while discipline is pending, treats the
situation as a disbarment by consent rather
than a special type resignation with its own
set of special rules to cover the situation as
Florida does. Florida would be well advised
to treat resignation with discipline pending
as a disbarment by consent, as recommended in the Model Rules. Readmission
after resignation with discipline pending
would then remain with the Board of Bar
Examiners, as it does after disbarment.
Readmission procedures after a resignation, whether or not triggered by pending
discipline, should be assigned to and the
responsibility of the bar admission agency
rather than the disciplinary agency. Readmission procedures after disbarment being
assigned to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, as noted before, has worked well
and with uniformity. The assignment of
readmission procedures after resignation

.
'

;
'

to bar examiners would be logical and consistent with their mission. Readmission in
Florida was routine after disbarment while
administered by the disciplinary agency.
Since 1972, when readmission after disbarment was assigned by the court to the
Florida Board of Bar Examiners of seventythree lawyers subsequently disbarred, one
has been found fully qualified and readmitted to practice.
The Model Rules, in providing standards
for readmission after disbarment, given
general and broad direction to the disciplinary agency in determining fitness for
readmittance.
Model Rule Standard 6 .2 provides that
the lawyer should not be able to apply for
readmission until at least five years after
the effective date of disbarment and should
not be readmitted unless he or she can
show by clear and convincing evidence:
rehabilitation, fitness to practice, competence, and compliance with all applicable
discipline or disability orders and rules.
The standard does not provide uniform
procedures or examinations within the
jurisdictions for use in determining with
consistency and accuracy fitness to practice, the very mission of bar examiners
who have long since developed valid examinations and procedures to determine with
uniformity fitness to practice.
In order to bring about uniformity, fairness to lawyers and the public in determining fitness to once again practice law, Florida has accomplished this, in the case of
disbarred lawyers, by using the already
existing machinery and experience of the
Board of Bar Examiners. Attempting to
develop a parallel body of rules, procedures, and examinations within the disciplinary system that would accomplish the
same task in Florida had not been successful in the past . Although the rules in Florida still provide that readmission after
resignation remains within the disciplinary
agency, a case can be made for also assigning to the bar examiners this responsibility,
particularly in those cases involving pending discipline, which require a minimum
three-year separation from practice before
a n y application for readmission may be

made, and those resignations of any type
involving a substantial period of separation
from the practice of law.

Reinstatement
In treating reinstatement after suspension, neither Florida, the Model Rules, nor
any other jurisdictions I'm aware of, have
assigned this responsibility to bar examiners. It remains for the disciplinary system
to determine fitness for reinstatement
after suspension.
The Model Rules recommend that suspension be for a specified period of time not
to exceed three years. Pointing out in those
cases where the misconduct has been so
severe that even a three year suspension
would not be adequate, the lawyer should
be disbarred. A specified period of suspesion futher provides in each case the basis
for a time certain in which the reinstatement process may be commenced after
suspension.
Reinstatement proceedings after suspension most often require at least ninety days
to complete, and in some instances, a much
longer period of time is required.
Requiring reinstatement in all cases of
suspension regardless of the duration of
the suspension would serve as an additional sanction where the su spension has
been ordered for a short period of time.
The Model Rules recommend reinstatement from a suspension of six months or
less be automatic upon the expiration of
the period of suspension along with the
filing of necessary affidavits of compliance
with the orders and conditions applicable
in the particular case.
Florida rules provide for automatic reinstatement in suspensions of three months
or less as no proof of rehabilitation or
further hearings are required. For greater
clarity, a rule change has been proposed
providing the suspension be for ninety
days or less, ra t h e r than three months or
less. The three month or ninety day rule in
Florida authorizing automatic reinstatement rather than six months, as recommended in the Model Rules, has created no
real problems in Florida, n or given rise to
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any efforts to provide a longer period of
suspension before rehabilitation or reinstatement hearings would be required.
The reinstatement procedures after suspension recommended in the Model Rules
follow those recommended for readmission after disbarment. The Model Rules
recommend reinstatement should require
the lawyer who has been suspended to
show by clear and convincing evidence
rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders, and a fitness to practice with current competence.
Factual issues involved are assigned to a
disciplinary hearing committee for recommendations to a disciplinary board and to
the court, following the same procedures
for readmission after disbarment.
Florida rules for reinstatement proceedings after a suspension of over three
months require of the lawyer a showing by
clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation and are set forth in greater detail in
the rules. The petition for reinstatement
after suspension is referred to a referee, a
trial judge, who conducts the hearing in
the same manner as a disciplinary trial, but
pleadings other than the reinstatement
petition are not required. The matter to be
decided by the referee is the fitness of the
suspended lawyer to resume the practice of
law. The rules place emphasis upon the
protection of the public. The petitioner
must establish that his or her conduct will
justify the restored confidence of the public, professional contemporaries, and of the
Supreme Court of Florida. The petitioner
must sustain the burden of proving fitness
to resume practice in terms of integrity as
well as professional competency.
Some of the elements that have been
used by the petitioner to sustain this burden in Florida are:
1. Strict compliance with the original dis-

toward those who were compelled to
bring about the original disciplinary
proceedings.
5. Personal assurances, supported by cor-

roborating evidence, revealing a sense
of repentance as well as a desire and
intention to conduct himself or herself
in an exemplary fashion in the future .
6 . In cases involving misappropriation, a

showing of restitution.
7. A showing by petitioner of conduct in

the life of the community to justify a
conclusion that petitioner has been impressed with the importance of ethical
conduct and is morally equipped to resume a postion of honor and trust
among peers at the bar.
Florida Rules further require the following items to be furnished by the petitioner:
1. Authorization to the District Director

of Internal Revenue for release of petitioner's federal income tax returns since
original admission to the bar. (Florida
has no state income tax. )
2 . A copy of all disciplinary judgments pre-

viously entered against the petitioner.
3. All specifics in the disciplinary proceed-

ings that resulted in the suspension or
resignation from which reinstatement
is being sought.
4. Personal data since suspension, includ-

ing occupation, income, residence, creditors, landlords, obligations, arrests, any
civil or criminal proceedings .
5 . Applications made for licenses requir-

ing proof of good character.
6. Proceedings involving his or her stand-

ing as a member of any organization or
as a license holder subsequent to the
suspension.

ciplinary order of suspension.
2. Evidence of unimpeachable character

and moral standing in the community.
3. Evidence of good reputation for profes-

sional ability and competence.
4. Evidence of lack of malice and ill feeling
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The items and examples above are not all
inclusive and individual petitions may require more or varied information depending upon the original disciplinary order.
A copy of the petition is filed with the
Supreme Court of Florida and is served

upon the disciplinary agency for investigation . The disciplinary agency assumes the
role of adversary in reinstatement proceedings as it does in all disciplinary matters.
The investigation of reinstatements, as
conducted by the disciplinary agency in
Florida, has been criticized in the past on
several occasions by members of the Board
of Governors who supervise the disciplinary system for the court in Florida. Criticism was prompted by reinstatement of
lawyers with whom board members were
familiar and believed were not worthy of
reinstatement.
In Florida where rehabilitation and fitness to resume practice must be shown by
the petitioner, little variation exists in the
outcome of the proceedings as conducted
by the disciplinary system . During the
1983-84 bar year, five reinstatement hearings were held and all five petitioners were
recommended for reinstatement. The Supreme Court, by its own review, denied
three. During the first nine-month period
of the 1984-85 bar year, eight reinstatemen t hearings were held and all eight petitioners were recommended for reinstatement as well. The Supreme C:ourt, by its
own review, denied one. Since July 1, 1983,
every petitioner for reinstatement requiring a hearing showing rehabilitation has
been recommended to the court for reinstatement. Referees in some cases have required little demonstration of the lofty
goals of rehabilitation. There is little to
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contest in a reinstatement proceeding if
the disciplinary agency has not changed
hats as bar examiners and conducted a thorough and complete investigation to determine the petitioner's fitness to resume the
practice of law. This is a most difficult assignment without a system of uniform testing and examinations to insure competency.
The disciplinary agency in Florida, in
conducting a reinstatement investigation,
does some or all of the following: furnish
copies of the petition for reinstatement to
concerned Board of Governor members,
local bar associations, and to discipline
committees which brought the original
charges . An attempt is made to locate and
interview those involved in the original
disciplinary case, including complainants,
referee, any other counsel involved, as well
as witnesses, prosecutors, probation officers, and judge, where a criminal case gave
rise to the suspension, or similarly if civil
litigation was involved. Consideration was
given, but not authorized by the Board of
Governors, to obtain any pertinent comments regarding the lawyer seeking reinstatement by publication of the pending
proceedings in the Florida Bar News, which
publication reaches all members of the
Florida Bar.
In reinstatement hearings, as now conducted, few witnesses ever come forward
to give negative or derogatory information
concerning the petitioner. Under current
rules, without a most detailed, intensive,
and penetrating investigation by the disciplinary agency, reinstatement of the petitioner is assured.
Depending upon the referee conducting
the reinstatement proceedings and the investigation conducted by the disciplinary
agency, the burden upon the petitioner
most often results in completing the petition, payment of necessary deposits and
costs, and producing some lawyers or
judges who will speak well of the petitioner. Rarely does a referee require the
petitioner to submit to any type of testing
or examination to insure competency in
current law, eth ics, or the rules, regardless
of the duration of the suspension or separation from practice.
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The Model Rules recommend that the
disciplinary agency, as in readmission after
disbarment proceedings, conduct reinstatement hearings and make final recommendations to the court.
The Board of Governors, in accepting
their responsibilities as the governing body
of the disciplinary system of the Florida
Bar, have attempted through several proposed rule changes to bring about additional improvement and uniformity in reinstatement proceedings .
One proposed change would provide that
a suspension of more than ninety days may
require passage of the Florida Bar examination. Another change would provide
that suspensions which continue more than
three years shall require passage of the
Florida Bar examination within one year
prior to reinstatement.
Proof of competency required in reinstatement proceedings where discipline had
been involved would then include a certification by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners
of the successful passage of the bar examination subsequent to the date of suspension. The successful passage of the Florida
Bar examination by being available to referees in suspensions of over ninety days and
being required in suspensions of over three
years will, no doubt, be used frequently in
suspensions of less than three years to
satisfy the requirement of competency.
A further change proposed in the rules
would provide that lawyers who retire,
resign without discipline, or have been
separated from the bar for non-payment of
dues for a period of three to five years may
be required to successfully complete all or a
portion of the Florida Bar examination
before reinstatement. Those who have
been separated for a period of five years or
more would not be reinstated except upon
certification by the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, as currently required by the
rules in readmission after disbarment proceedings . The disciplinary agency would
not have to determine, in these cases, as it
currently does, fitness without a valid test
or examination for competency.
The Model Rules offer no specific recommendations for determining proof of com18 I The Bar Examiner I August 1985

petency in reinstatement or readmission
proceedings regardless of the reason or
period of separation or suspension.
Readmission and reinstatement proceedings are necessary to prove rehabilitation
of the laywer. Rehabilitation should reflect
a fitness to resume the practice of law and
requires a showing of the restoration 0f
integrity, good character, and competence,
the same qualities which were required of
the lawyer for licensure.
Disciplinary agencies are not and should
not be charged with establishing procedures and expertise to determine of a person those qualities required for licensure.
The disciplinary system is the structure established to direct its talents and resources
in developing procedures and expertise to
ferret out of the law those who have demonstrated 'by their conduct they are for
some reason unable or unwilling to properly discharge their professional duties.
Florida has been a leader in giving the
Board of Bar Examiners as in readmission
proceedings after disbarment the continuing responsibility in determining those
qualities required for licensure, where
those same qualities are necessary to be
demonstrated for readmission and reinstatement as well.
There continues in Florida a forward
looking move toward greater involvement
of the Board of Bar Examiners by recognizing and using their expertise and experience in all types of reinstatement proceedings where fitness to practice and proof of
competency are required to be shown.

South Carolina's Rule 5 Works Well
by Bruce Littlejohn

The Constitution of South
Carolina imposes on the supreme court the
sole responsibility of determining those
persons entitled to practice law and those
persons who should be disbarred or otherwise sanctioned. In 1979, I chaired a
committee appointed to study admissions
to our Bar. Our study necessarily came to
involve legal education and, in tum, lawyer
competency in general.
In February 1982, I prepared, by request,
an article for publication in the Bar Examiner
entitled "Lawyer (in)Competency: Who is
Responsible?" I have now been requested
to comment upon how our Rule 5, which
was adopted in 1979 as an outgrowth of
our committee study, has worked.
Rule 5 of the Rules for Admission to the
Bar for South Carolina is directed to the
applicant. It has nothing to do with the operation of any law school and we recognize
their academic freedom to structure legal
education. At the same time, I am sure the
law schools recognize our constitutional
duty to see that those persons admitted to
the Bar are competent and worthy of hire.

Competency is not easy to define, evaluate or accomplish. Our committee study
was inspired by observations of members
of the supreme court that many young
lawyers, and sometimes older ones too,
were less than capable of representing
their clients skillfully in the trial of a case.
Rule 5 provides five basic approaches which
are aimed at improving lawyer competency:
(1) A requirement that the clerk of the
supreme court communicate every summer with the pre-law advisors in South Carolina undergraduate schools and urge
them to encourage students who expect to
pursue a career at law to study English composition, English public speaking, United
States history, accounting, economics, literature, political science, logic and philosophy.
(2) We require that law students al(plying to stand for the bar exam in South Carolina must have taken courses in the areas of
contracts, property, constitutional law, business law, civil procedure, commercial law,
equity, evidence, legal writing and research,
professional responsibility, taxation, torts,
trial advocacy and domestic relations.
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(3) We require every admittee to the Bar
to have had eleven trial experiences before
he or she may try a case alone: three in
Criminal Court, three in Civil Court, three
in Family Court, one in an administrative
law hearing and one in an equity hearing.
These experiences may be acquired by
assisting an attorney or by observation of
an entire trial.
(4) A student practice rule has been
promulgated.
(5) Commencing in the fall of 1984, a
thirty-hour "Bridge the Gap" Program is
required of all applicants before admission.
The impact of all of these is difficult to
prove. Fortunately, we do not have to prove
with mathematical certainty the benefits
which admittees receive from these requirements. It is sufficient that we have a conviction that students who have complied with
these rules are better prepared to serve
clients than students who have not had the
benefit of these programs.

I will now proceed to briefly discuss each.
In the pre-law handbook of the Association
of American Law Schools will be found the
following : "The Association's responsibility
in matters of legal education cannot be met
by prescribing certain courses and extracurricular activities for students planning
later to study law." Such a statement is coming to be recognized as a disservice to the
student, the lawyer and his client. The medical profession requires study of certain
subjects prior to admission to medical
school. The law schools might well emulate
the formula . Two important committees
agree with us .
In recent years, the American Bar' Association has appointed two committees :
one chaired by Attorney Ronald J. Foulis of
California to study legal education 1 and one
chaired by Attorney Herschel H. Friday of
Arkansas to study professional competency.2
The Foulis committee had this to say:
. . . In our view, the time may be ripe for the
reformulation of advisory statements on prelegal education . Certain perceived deficiencies
may be more suitably remedied by prelegal than
by legal education . The possibilities for action
include the recommendation of a particularized
prelaw curriculum or of certain prelaw majors,
limited but specific course recommendation, or
at a m inimum the dissemination of information
about legal education and the legal profession
that takes into account relevant, recent research
findings . . .

The Friday committee agreed with the
Foulis committee and said:

Bruce Lilllejohn is Chief Justice of South Carolina .
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. .. Prelegal education is an important beginning
in the eventual mastery of the knowledge and
skills of the lawyer. The Foulis Report recommended that the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) confer for the
purpose of reexamining and rewriting the 1953
AALS Statement of Prelegal Education to provide clearer and more concise guidelines for
prelaw students. While the principal concern
expressed in the Foulis Report relative to prelegal
educatio n w as the need to master advanced
writing skills and effective oral comunication,
the repo rt went on to support the view that
underg r aduate educat ion s hould include
'courses that provide a basic understanding of
accounting, economics, psychology, and of his-

torical and contemporary social and political
processes.' .. . The Task Force concurs with the
recommendation and urges, with the Foulis
Report, that prelaw students should receive clear
and concise information expressing that prefere nce. In the broadest sense, we take the Foulis
Report to support undergraduate liberal education as highly desirable preparation for law
school (as does the 1953 AALS Statement), and
the Task Force joins in that position.

I have little sympathy for the student
who takes "crip" courses unrelated to skills
desirable at the law in order to build up a
good GPR and enhance the possibility of
getting a law school entrance application
approved. Lawyers are in the word business; they have nothing to offer their
clients except written and spoken words .
Skills in the field of communication should
be developed at the undergraduate level.
Law schools offer no courses in public
speaking, but the faculty is unable to explain why.
The University of South Carolina Law
School, which supplies about ninety per
cent of our applicants, lists more than one
hundred courses in the catalog. Many of
them are totally unrelated to the problems
which the South Carolina lawyer will most
likely be solving. It would be well, if one
had the luxury of time, to study all of these
courses, but inasmuch as time is limited,
we reached the conclusion tha t students
should be studying the subjects concerning

those areas of the law into which they will
most likely be thrown . Every law school
has what they refer to as a core curriculum,
required subjects, which are so important
every student should study them . Our
Rule 5 includes the subjects named in most
core curriculums: contracts, property, constitutional law, legal research, civil and
criminal procedure. The Rule merely adds
a few more which we think equally important. Students should not be allowed to
waste their time on Roma n law, w ith which
they will never be concerned, when in
truth they will be concerned with such
things as torts, taxation, insurance and
domestic relations.
Our Rule requires that each admittee to
the Bar have eleven trial experiences in
various courts as named a bove. This w ill
not assure a good trial lawyer, but inescapably, the admittee will know m ore about
how to act than if he or she had n ever seen
a case tried. Prior to the adoption of our
Rule, it was not unusual to find young law yers admitted to practice who had n ever
even seen a case tried before a judge or jury.
Our student practice rule permits selected students to participate, along with a
lawyer, in the trial of cases. Similar rules
have been promulgated in many other
states .
Our " Bridge the Gap" Program follows
the pattern of several other states which
now require that students take a course in
office and courtroom procedures . Ours is
more comprehensive than most. It is d irected by Chief Justice ElectJ. B. Ness. It is
a thirty-hour course, and the facult y is com posed of some of the sta te's m ost outstanding lawyers and judges. We undertake to
teach the young lawyer h ow t o act and
what to do when the client comes to the
office and how to act and what to do w h en
he goes to court for the firs t t ime . T h e
students were unhappy wi th this course
when it began . On the las t day, students
were delighted w ith what they had learned.
At first the dema nds of Rule 5 were attacked by the academic world, but the Rule
has n ow come to be accepted and the benefits appreciated . In order to improve the
admin ist ration of justice, w e need to insure
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the competency of the judges and the lawyers. This can be done by improving the law
student and his education. The law student
can be improved by having him begin his
training for a career at the law at the undergraduate level. All of this we undertake.
Legal education and lawyer competency
will not be greatly improved until the
House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association come to grips with the accreditation of law schools. Routinely, the House
rubber stamps the recommendations of the
Section on Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar. The section is dominated by professors and law school deans. Few members
of the Bar have read the requirements for
the accreditation of a law school. A detailed
study of these recommendations will reveal
that there is substantially nothing therein
which requires good training for the student. Much is included to assure favorable
working conditions for the faculty.
Mr. Allan Ashman has requested me to
report on the workings of our Rule S which
has now been in effect for five years . The
answer, Mr. Ashman, is that it is working
well. The bench and bar in South Carolina
are happy with the program. The students
are benefitting from it, and in turn, the
lawyer and his client are assured of better
representation.
1. Law School and Professional Education Report and

Recommendations of the Special Committee for a
study of Legal Education of the American Bar
Association .
2. Report of Task Force on Professional Competency
-American Bar Association.
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Stephen P. Klein: On Testing
This article is !he fourth in a series dealing with such
topics as scaling MBE and essay scores, procedures for
setting pass/ fail scores, and score reporting. Because ii is
our intention to structure these articles so Iha/ they will be
of optimum benefit to bar examiners and bar admission
administrators, readers are in vited lo suggest additional
topics for this series. The views expressed in Dr. Klein 's
article are his own and do no/ necessarily represent !hose of
NCBE.

IV. Essay Grading: Fictions, Facts
and Forecasts

The first portion of this article discusses four common myths about
grading essay answers . These misconceptions often lead to grading practices that do
not conform to official board of bar examiner policies or satisfy basic professional
standards for score reliability and fairness
to applicants. The four myths are:
• It is best to have one and only one reader
per question.
• Extraneous characteristics of an answer,
such as length and penmanship, do not
affect grades if readers agree to ignore
these factors.
• All essay questions have the same influence on whether an applicant passes if all
the questions have the same maximum
score; i.e., the number of points assigned
to a question determines how much
weight it carries.

• Two essay tests are equally difficult to
pass if the score required for passing
them is the same; i.e ., even though these
tests had different questions and readers.
The second portion of this article provides suggestions for avoiding the problems that are often created by these myth s.
Finally, it discusses how many states are
now implementing these suggestions.

Myth #1: Only One Reader Is Better
The Bar Examiners ' Handbook recommends
that "all of the answers to a particular
question should be graded by the same
reader. " (page 283) The assumption underlying this recommendation is that if the
same reader grades all answers, then there
is a greater likelihood that the same grading standards will be applied to these
answers .
Empirical evidence usually supports the
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foregoing assumption, but not the recommendation that is made from it. Controlled
experimental studies show that when a bar
exam reader regrades a set of answers
within a few days of the first reading (but
without knowledge of the grades assigned
initially), the second grade assigned to an
answer tends to be somewhat (and sometimes radically) different than the first
grade. Nevertheless, the average discrepancy between the first and second reading
by the same reader is slightly smaller than
it is between two independent readers. For
instance, in one study1 readers agreed with
themselves 75 percent of the time as to
whether or not an answer was passing .
Readers agreed with each other only 67
percent of the time.
On the surface, these data support the
recommendation to use only one reader
per question. However, I suspect that bar
examiners will be less likely to embrace this
recommendation when they discover some
of the potential sources of the greater
between than within reader inconsistencies. These sources range from preferences
for certain handwriting and penmanship
styles to fundamental differences in the
criteria that should be applied in the grading process.
For example, suppose that one, but not
both, of the readers assigned to a question
believes that it is appropriate to deduct
points from an answer that discusses (perhaps incorrectly) an issue that is irrelevant
to the question. Unless a protocol is developed for handling answers that discuss
such issues before the grading process begins, there is a greater likelihood that the
readers will agree more with themselves
than they will with each other in the grades
they assign.
Another important source of differences
between readers is how much emphasis
each reader places on the different parts of
a question, their preferences for which
precedents should be discussed, and the
order in which issues are considered. If two
qualified readers do not agree on a question's scoring guide and the relative importance of different aspects of an answer,
how can applicants be expected to know
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how to compose their answers?
The rationale that the same reader should
be used for all answers in order to maximize reliabili ty is faulty because the source
of the greater reliability may be factors
that have nothing to do with answer quality. Instead, they may be idiosyncratic to
the reader. A few jurisdictions compound
the single reader problem by having the
board member who drafted the question
act as the sole grader of that question's
answers . After all, it is thought, the person
who wrote the question knows what he or
she is trying to test with that question. The
fact that no one else knows what is being
tested, including some of the board member's colleagues, does not seem to deter the
handful of jurisdictions that still use this
practice.

Myth #2: Grades Are Not Affected by
Extraneous Factors
A second myth about grading bar exam
essay answers is that readers base their
grades solely on answer quality and that
instructions to readers to ignore extraneous factors eliminate the influence of these
factors. The fact that this does not happen
was demonstrated clearly in an experiment
that John Garfinkle and I conducted with
the participants at the NCBE's seminar for
new bar examiners in April 1980.
John Garfinkle developed two answers,
A and B, to the same essay question. Both
answers were of about equal quality. He
then prepared two versions of each answer
(A-1, A-2, B-1, and B-2). Versions A-1 and
B-1 discussed the issues in the question in a
clear and concise manner. Versions A-2 and
B-2 contained the same content, but used
about fifty percent more words to present
it. In other words, the second version was
merely longer than the first one.
The bar examiners were assigned randomly to two groups. One group graded
answers A-1 and B-2 while a second group
graded A-2 and B-1. Both groups were instructed to grade the answers in terms of
their quality and to ignore such things as
grammar, spelling, and length. On the average, the examiners in the first group graded
answer B-2 higher than A-1. The examin-

ers in the second group graded answer A-2
higher than B-1. Thus, in both groups, version 2, the longer answer, received the
higher grade. This occurred despite the
fact that bar examiners were told to ignore
answer length and almost all of them
claimed that they preferred shorter answers.
The knowledge that longer answers tend
to receive higher grades regardless of instructions to readers to ignore length probably comes as no surprise to experienced
bar examiners. However, bar examiners
may not be aware of the many other factors that inappropriately influence grades.
For instance, applicant C's chances of passing the exam will be reduced if (1) applicant
/\s and B's answers tend to be among the
better answers to the questions and (2)
applicant C's answers are always graded
after /\s and B's answers. Similarly, handwriting quality has often been shown to
affect essay grades.2

Myth #3: Number of Points Assigned
to a Question Determines Its Weight
Another common myth about grading essay answers is that if the theoretical maximum score on two questions is the same,
such as 100 points, then both questions
carry the same weight in determining the
relative standings of the applicants on the
essay portion of the exam.
The fallacy of this belief is demonstrated
in the table below with hypothetical data
for five examinees (A through E).
Examinee
A
B

Question I

D
E

so

Question 2
100
99
98
97
96

Average

30

98

c

IO

20
30
40

Total
llO
ll9
128
137
146
128

Note that the maximum scores on Questions 1 and 2 were 50 and 100, respectively,
and that the rank ordering of examinees on
Question 1 was directly opposite to the
rank ordering on Question 2. Nevertheless,
the final rank ordering was perfectly cons is-

tent with Question 1; i.e., the question that
had the lowest possible maximum score.
Question 1 carried far more weight because
the scores on this question spread out more
from the average score on this question
than did the scores on Question 2 spread
out from their average score. In statistical
terms, Question 1 had a much larger "standard deviation" than Question 2.
Unless a jurisdiction takes specific steps
to prevent questions from having markedly
different standard deviations, it is not
uncommon to find that one question will
have a standard deviation which is twice
that of another question . It therefore carries twice the weight in determining total
essay scores. It also refutes a state board's
claim that all questions are of equal importance in determining who passes. An extreme example of this situation is the question on which all applicants receive the
same grade. This question would have a
standard deviation of 0 (zero) and it would
have no impact on who passed or failed.

Myth #4: Essay Grading Standards
Can Be Maintained Across Exams
A fourth myth is that a state is able to
maintain the same essay grading standards
across exams even though (1) the ques·tions on these exams change each time the
test is administered and (2) there are often
changes in who grades the answers. The
belief that grading standards can be maintained across administrations is often referred to as the "seventy percent m yth" or
" I can recognize a passing answer w hen I
see one."
While many bar examiners believe they
can recognize a passing answer when they
see one, there is strong empirical evidence
to the contrary. This evidence comes from
several sources. For instance, two independent readers often disagree on whether
a given answer is passing and on the percentage of answers in a group that are passing. As noted above, readers are not substantially more consistent with themselves
than they are with each other. Thus, not
only can one reader's perception of a passing answer differ from another reader's
assessment, but even over a few days, the
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same reader will change his or her mind
regarding the relative and absolute quality
of an answer.
Studies also show that it is possible to
affect the score assigned to an answer by
embedding it in a set of relatively high versus low quality answers.3 Statistical analyses further reveal that when applicant ability is held constant (through the MBE), bar
exam readers tend to be more lenient in
grading answers written on February exams than in grading answers on July
exams.4
Two questions can have very different
average scores even though in advance of
the exam they were believed to be of equal
difficulty. If this can happen (and we know
it does), then it is apparent that two tests
(made up of such questions) can also vary
in difficulty even though a thorough but
subjective appraisal of them suggested they
were comparable.
The problem here is that if a state's exam
unintentionally varies in difficulty from
one administration to the next, then that
exam is not fair to applicants who happen
to take an unusually hard version of it. We
know this sometimes occurs and there is
no way of determining in advance of giving
a test how difficult its questions will be or
how leniently the answers to them will be
graded. Attempts to subjectively adjust for
perceived differences in essay test difficulty across administrations are notoriously unsuccessful.

Recommendations
The bleak picture painted here can be
brightened considerably by adopting a few
simple procedures :
1. Assign at least two readers to each

question.
Some jurisdictions have every answer independently graded by two readers. Other
states, divide the answers up among the set
of readers assigned to the question.
Most states with multiple readers per
question also employ some form of reread
procedure. For example, one state has a
second reading of all the essay answers of
applicants who came close to either side of
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the pass/ fail line on the total exam after the
initial reading of their essay answers . If the
score on the second reading differs substantially from the score on the first reading, then the two readers meet and resolve
what score should be assigned to the answer. Otherwise, the average of the two
scores is used because the average is usually the best estimate of answer quality.
2. Have the readers assigned to a ques-

tion agree on a scoring guide for that
question.
A preliminary scoring guide for a question
should be developed before the test is
given. This helps to assure the question
really measures what it is supposed to
measure. For instance, do the persons who
review the question agree with the guide?
After the test is administered, the readers assigned to the question should also
review the guide for appropriateness. This
activity includes reading several answers
to determine whether the question elicited
the responses that were anticipated. If not,
the scoring guide should be revised in a
way that indicates how to handle common
responses.
3. Calibrate the readers in the use of the

scoring guide through the use of benchmark answers.
The first step in this process involves each
reader independently evaluating a set of

two to four answers and deciding upon the
relative quality of the answers in this set.
All the readers assigned to a question evaluate the same common set of answers.
This process is called "round robin" grading. For instance, if there are three readers
assigned to a question, each reader would
read one answer, pass this answer clockwise to the next reader, who would evaluate it, and then pass it on to the third
reader. In this way, all three readers can
evaluate a common set of three or four
answers.
In the second step, the readers compare
notes on their independent evaluations of
the relative standings of the answers in the
common set. This activity often leads to
modifying the scoring guide in order to
handle typical (albeit unanticipated) responses to the question. The calibration
process involves one additional step in
those jurisdictions that do not scale their
essay scores to the MBE. This step consists
of the readers deciding which answers
should or should not be considered as
"passing".
An important feature of this process is
that all the readers make their initial evaluations of answer quality independently. In
other words, one reader does not know the
grade assigned to an answer by another
reader until they meet to discuss the
answers. This approach helps to avoid one
reader dominating another and simulates
more closely the actual grading process.
The process of independent "round
robin" readings and achieving consensus
on relative quality is repeated until there is
an adequately high level of agreement
among readers on the relative quality of
the answers used for reader calibration. It
usually requires four or five " round robin"
grading sessions (with four or five answers
per session) to achieve this degree of consistency.
After the readers achieve an adequately
high agreement level, they identify the one
or two answers at each score level that best
illustrate the quality of the answers at that
level. For instance, one state grades each
answer on a five -point scale. As part of the

calibration process, that state's readers
identify five "benchmark" answers, one
answer for each of the five points on the
scale. These answers serve as guides in the
grading of other answers . For example, a
grader might read an answer and then ask
a series of questions, such as: "Is this
answer better, worse, or about the same
qi:iality as the benchmark 3?'"'If it is better,
is it as good as the benchmark 4 ?"
Once the benchmarks are agreed upon,
each reader assigned to a question reads a
common set of about five answers to their
question. This "round-robin" reading of
answers is done independently. Any disagreements in the grades assigned are discussed, the scoring guide modified as
needed, and another set of five answers are
subjected to " round robin" grading . This
sequence of activities is repeated until all
the readers for a given question independently agree on the scores that should be
assigned. They cannot agree to disagree.
Taken together, recommendations one
through three will help to eliminate the
problem of essay scores being affected by
the conscious and unconscious idiosyncratic
preferences of a single reader. However,
when multiple readers are used , they
should be monitored to insure that their
grading standards do not drift apart.
4. Use a realistic score range.

Many states still say they grade answers on
a 100-point scale. However, an analysis of
their data suggests otherwise. The grades
tend to be assigned in 5-point intervals and
almost all of them fall between SO and 90.
Thus, only nine score levels are being used.
Morever, only one especially low score on
such a 100-point scale, such as a 30, may
effectively preclude the examinee from
passing the entire exam.
The foregoing situation has led several
states to give up th e old 100-point scale and
grade answers along a 5, 7, or IO-point
continuum. This practice generally leads to
more reliable scoring because readers are
not asked to make distinctions where there
are no real differences in answer quality. In
general, the lo nger the question and the
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'1
more applicants answering it, the greater
the need to have more points along the
score continuum .
5. Control for differences in standard de-

viations (score spread) among questions
so that the questions carry equal (or
prespecified) weight in determining total
essay scores .
This recommendation applies only to those
jurisdictions that scale their essay scores to
the MBE. In these jurisdictions, readers
have merely to determine the quality of the
answers relative to each other whereas in
jurisdictions that do not scale, readers also
have to decide which answers are passing .
States that do not scale their essay scores
to the MBE but statistically control for differences in standard deviations among essay questions are likely to violate the principles underlying grading on an absolute
(as distinct from a relative) scale.
The states that do scale their essay
scores to the MBE can use indirect and/or
direct controls on the standard deviations .
Indirect control involves readers being
instructed about the percentage of answers
that should be placed in each of the possible
score categories for a question (i.e ., grading on a predetermined curve) and requiring that the same set of score categories be
used on all questions .
Direct controls are somewhat more complicated . They involve converting the scores
on each question to a prespecified mean
and standard deviation. For example, several states convert the scores on each question to a distribution of scores that has a
mean of SO and a standard deviation of 10 .
This conversion procedure does not change
the examinees' relative standings, but it
does r esult in the questions carrying equal
weight .
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Direct controls have several advantages.
They insure that each question has the
same weight. They also permit using one
grading scale for one question and a different grading scale for another question
without affecting how much weight each
question carries . For instance, the readers
can use a 5-point scale for Question 1 and a
10-point scale for Question 2. And, this
will have no impact on the weight each
question carries.
The third advantage of direct controls is
that they permit more weight to be assigned to some questions than to others
(e.g ., those that are more complicated and
for which applicants are given more time to
answer) . Some jurisdictions use this technique of planned differential weighting in
conjunction with the direct controls they
place on standard deviations .
Finally, by converting the scores on each
question to a truly common scale (as distinct from one that just appears to be the
same), it is easier to appropriately compare
a given applicant's scores among questions.
The only major disadvantage to direct controls is that they are somewhat more difficult to explain.
6. Scale the essay scores to MBE scale

scores .
Scaling the essay scores to the MBE scale
scores puts both the MBE and the essay on
the same scale of measurement . Moreover,
because the MBE scale scores have been
equated across the years, a given MBE
scale score represents the same level of
proficiency regardless of the exam on which
it was earned. This same important characteristic also applies to essay scale scores.
Thus, setting the pass /fail line on the total
exam in terms of a combination of MBE
and essay scale scores eliminates the problem of some essay tests being more difficult than others because of the questions
asked and/or the leniency with which the
answers to them are graded.
There are just as many myths about scaling essay scores to the MBE as there are
about essay grading. For instance, contrary
to the popular misconceptions regarding

this topic, scaling essay scores to the MBE
does not give any more weight to the MBE
than to the essay, it does not set the percent
passing at a given level, and it does not
change a given applicant's essay score in
terms of that applicant's MBE score.

Forecasts
Most of the applicants who took the July
1985 bar exam will be affected by one or
more of the procedures described above.
For instance, all of the following jurisdictions scale their essay scores to the MBE
(or to their own equated multiple choice
exam):
Alaska
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri

1. Stephen P. Klein, An Analysis of Grading Practices
on the California Bar Examination. Report prepared for the Committee of Bar Examine rs o f the
State Bar of California, December 1977.
2 . David Hughes, Brian Keeling and Bryan Tuck,
Affects of Achievement Expectations and Handwriting Quality on Scoring Essays. Journal of Educational Measurement, Vol. 20, No. 1 , Spring 1983
pp 65-70
3 . David Hughes and Brian Keeling, The Use of
Model Essays to Reduce Context Affects in Essay
Scoring. Jo urnal o f Educational Measurement Vol.
21 No 3, Fall 1984 pp 277-281.
4. Stephen P. Klein , Sources of Variations in Passing
Rates on California Bar Examinations. Report prepared for the Committee of Bar Examiners, State
of California. July 1983 (Rep No. PR 83-2 ).

Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Texas
Wisconsin

In the years to come, I expect more jurisdictions will scale their essay scores to the
MBE, employ multiple readers per question, have automatic and independent reread procedures for applicants who were
close to the pass/fail line after the first
reading, and control for differences in
standard deviations among questions .
These technical changes will be adopted as
bar examiners continue to question the
myths surrounding essay grading and as
they have to cope with the petitions filed
by failing applicants who feel they were
unfairly treated.
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A National Law Practice
Will Piper Lead the Way?
by Allan Ashman

After following a rather serpentine route through federal trial and
appellate courts, New Hampshire's residency requirement finally was struck down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Supreme Court
of New Hampshire v. Piper.I New Hampshire
had required that applicants for admission
to the bar become residents of the state
before they actually could be sworn into
the bar.
Both durational and simple residency requirements have been subject to intense
scrutiny in recent years. Some states voluntarily abandoned their residency requirements while other federal and several state
courts held existing rules unconstitutional.
Still, before Piper, many states had some
form of residency requirement either as a
prerequisite for taking the bar examination, or for admission on motion, or, like
New Hampshire, as a prerequisite for
Allan Ashman is executive director of the National Conference of Bar Examiners in Ch icago. The opinions are his
own and do not necessarily represent those of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners.
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simply being sworn in. Now, the constitutionality of all such requirements is suspect
following the Piper decision.

The Basic Question
But what does Piper really portend? For
example, is it simply the logical denouement of one unreasonable and impractical
restriction facing bar applicants, or does it
mark the beginning of the removal of all
barriers to the interstate practice of law?
What follows are some random observations and a bit of idle speculation on this
provocative question.
Are the Rules Too Restrictive?
During the past decade, there have been
increasing protestations from many quarters that the current rules requiring the
passing of a bar examination and admission
to the bar in each state in which lawyers
wish to practice regularly constitute intolerable and impractical restrictions on
the present-day practice of law, on the
development of a needed national law practice, and on the legal needs of national,

commercial, financial and industrial business entities . The residency restriction, in
particular, had become increasingly vexatious with the growth of law firms that
maintain branch offices in many states and
with the increased use of in-house counsel
by multistate corporations .
In 1978, Chesterfield Smith, a past president of the American Bar Association,
stated that it would be in the "national
interest and the interest of nationwide
consumers of legal services that restrictive
practices and state barriers be eliminated
and interstate reciprocity broadened ... ."2
Smith believed that the "chilling" of interstate bar admissions was in conflict with
the long-range economic interests of the
legal profession and the nation.3 He also
thought that many of the states that had
erected fences against out-of-state lawyers
had done so primarily to protect their own
lawyers from professional competition.

No Fear of 'Carpetbagging'
The court in Piper made it quite clear that
this reason was "insubstantial" to justify
such barriers, noting that the privileges
and immunities clause of the Constitution
was designed primarily to prevent such
economic protectionism.4 The court emphasized that the privileges and immunities clause was intended to create a national economic union . The court did not
share the concern of Chief Judge Levin
Campbell and Judge Stephen Breyer of the
U.S . Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
who, in the First Circuit's en bane reconsideration of the Piper decision, expressed the
view that New Hampshire could reasonbly
fear that complete abolition of residency
requirements would mean large law firms
in distant states would exert significant
influence upon the decisions, practices, and
makeup of the New Hampshire bar.s Law
practice in certain fields, the judges stated,
could come to be dominated by out-ofstate lawyers whose only connection with
the state would be their desire to earn
money there.
But the court did not seem concerned,
stating that barring nonresidents was an
overbroad means of assuring that attor-

neys would be available for court or amenable to disciplinary proceedings . A review
of nonresident attorneys appearing in New
Hampshire courts, either as members of
the bar or pro hac vice, indicated, according to
the court, that residence was not substantially related to in-court conduct or availability. The court also believed that New
Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement was "underinclusive" as well, because
it permitted lawyers who moved away
from the state to retain membership in the
bar. The court concluded that there was no
reason to believe that a former resident
would maintain a more active practice in
the New Hampshire courts than would a
nonresident lawyer who had never lived in
the state. Nor did the court believe that a
nonresident lawyer would conduct his practice in a dishonest manner.
A nonresident lawyer's professional duty
and interest in his reputation should, the
court observed, provide the same incentive
to maintain high ethical standards as they
do for resident lawyers. A lawyer will be
concerned with his reputation in any community where he practices, regardless of
where he may live, the court stated. Furthermore, a non-resident lawyer can be disciplined for unethical conduct. The court
emphasized that the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire has the authority to discipline all members of the bar regardless of
where.they reside . New Hampshire could,
the court pointed out, discipline nonresident lawyers in the same manner in which
it disciplines resident members.

What the Court Didn't Hold
Justice Wiliam Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Piper, suggested that the residency
requirement promoted New Hampshire's
"interest in maximizing the number of resident lawyers, so as to increase the quality
of the pool from which its lawmakers can
be drawn." But this notion was rejected by
the court's majority, which pointed out
that only a few of New Hampshire's legislators were lawyers and that, besides, nonlawyers could serve on the state's courts.
Having said this, the court emphasized
that its holding in no way interfered with
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the ability of the states to regulate their
bars. Unlike pro hac vice applicants, nonresidents who seek to join a state bar must
have the same professional qualifications
required of resident lawyers.

Residency Rules in Question
What then are we to make of this decision?
Clearly one important barrier for out-of
state lawyers to be admitted to the practice
of law has, for all apparent purposes, been
removed. While the precise effect of the
decision is still unknown, it would seem
logical to conclude that all residency rules
for purposes of admission to the bar must
now be called into serious question. But
the Supreme Court in Piper has not gone so
far as to declare that under existing economic conditions the interstate practice of
law is constitutionally mandated. It seems
equally clear after Piper that each state still
has a legitimate interest in regulating the
admission and practice of lawyers to ensure that lawyers are professionally competent, are familiar with local laws and procedures, and abide by the rule governing
professional responsibility. But to effectuate these purposes and to avoid needless
litigation, I submit that in the wake of the
Piper decision, states should begin a systematic review of their admission standards
with an eye toward retaining only those
standards that are deemed to be reasonably
related to the state's legitimate interests.
Piper Leads the Way
This, it is entirely plausible that Piper will
serve as a catalyst for the removal of other
barriers, reasonable or otherwise, that frust rat e or inhibit the interstate practice of
law. In the past decade, we have witnessed
a rather dramatic change in the practice of
law characterized in large part by the soaring numbers of multistate practitioners.
This phenomenon probably can be attributed to a variety of factors including increased lawyer specialization, the greater
mobility of lawyers and clients, and increased uniformity of state laws as a consequence of more and more states adopting
model and uniform laws and federal practice and procedures .
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Consequently, Piper could spur a relaxation of pro hac vice admission and related
requirements of association with local
counsel for attorneys already admitted to
practice . Pro hac vice status does not allow
the nonresident to practice in a state on the
same terms as a resident member of the
bar. The lawyer appearing pro hac vice must
be associated with a local lawyer who is
present for trial or argument. Furthermore, a decision on whether to grant pro hac
vice status to an out-of-state lawyer is
purely discretionary. Also, states which
currently require nonresident attorneys to
maintain an in-state office may wish to
rethink the purpose of this policy in light of
the Piper decision.
Piper could also have an indirect impact
upon full admission to the bar in a sister
state by motion upon proof of professional
competence and personal integrity. On the
one hand, states which currently permit
reciprocity might seek to ease such admission by relaxing the prescribed years of
practice from the customary five-out-ofthe-preceding-seven-years in the jurisdiction of original admission to three-of-thepast-five-years. Those states which do not
permit admission on motion and require
the seasoned practitioner to pass another
full bar examination might explore the
possibility of substituting a more limited
attorneys' examination in local law and
practice. This could be complemented by a
rule requiring mandatory attendance of
nonresident attorneys at periodic seminars
on state practice, a step the court in Piper
viewed as a less restrictive alternative to
the existing residency requirement.

Rethinking the Multistate
To the degree that Piper does provide a spur
toward more liberal rules and procedures
with regard to the interstate practice of
law, it might also prompt states t o rethink
some basic assumptions about the nature
and uses of the Multistate Bar Examination. In recent years, there has been an
increasing sentiment for " national acceptance of a multistate bar examination."6
Such sentiment generally has embraced
the twin concepts of greater uniformity

and the transferability of MBE scores. For
example, the Chief Justice of Nebraska,
Norman Krivosha, thinks it "totally counter-productive to design a national examination to be given all over the country on
the same day and then to redefine what
'passing' the examination means from state
to state. If the function of the MBE is to
determine whether an applicant, given the
right answer, still cannot recognize it, it
seems to follow," the chief justice noted,
" that the inability to recognize the right
answer is the same throughout the country and should [be] treated the same
everywhere."7
Chief Justice Krivosha also has been a
leading advocate of liberalizing existing
rules with regard to the transfer of MBE
scores from one state ot another. He finds
little sense in the current practice which
exists in several jurisdictions requiring an
applicant to take another MBE examination even though the individual may have
successfully completed the same exam just
six months earlier.a

In Conclusion
Perhaps it is premature to characterize the
Piper decision as a watershed in the evolution of bar admissions and the interestate
practice of law. The more appropriate consideration seems to be whether the states
are going to allow the freedom of movement that the decision implies or whether
they are going to respond by imposing
other restrictions. The next few months
should provide a clue as to the direction in
which we are headed.
1. 53 L.W. 4238, March 4, 1985.
2. Chesterfield Smith, " Time for a National Practice
of Law Act. " April 1978, ABA j ournal, pp. 557, 559 .
3. Id., at 560.
4 . 53 L.W. at 4241 (footnote #18).
5. 723 F.2d 110 (1983) .
6. Krivosha, " Planning for the 21st Century," 54 Th e
Bar Examiner 23 , February 1985.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 23, 24.

Impact on Discipline
Finally, Piper should prompt all jurisdictions
to re-examine their own professional disciplinary standards and procedures. Until
now, companies and law firms that regularly have business in states with residency
requirements have had to retain a local law
firm to act as "local counsel." The immediate impact of Piper should be to make it
markedly easier for big law firms in major
cities, and for corporations with large legal
departments to handle lawsuits wherever
they are filed . Therefore, it is far more
likely that weak or ineffectual state moral
character certification and lackadaisical enforcement of existing rules of professional
responsibility could become the burden of
sister states. Upholding the standards of
professional responsibility must now be
approached with less diffidence and indifference . Rather, states should now become
acutely sensitive to the fact that one state's
disinterest in matters of moral character
and fitness could become another state's
embarrassment.
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Hiram A. Sanchez-Martinez, Executive Director, Puerto Rico Board of Bar Examiners asks a
question from the floor
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Attorneys Professional Competence
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